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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of fault detection and isolation of wind turbines using a mixed Bayesian/Set-
membership approach. Modeling errors are assumed to be unknown but bounded, following the set-membership
approach. On the other hand, measurement noise is also assumed to be bounded, but following a statistical dis-
tribution inside the bounds. To avoid false alarms, the fault detection problem is formulated in a set-membership
context. Regarding fault isolation, a new fault isolation scheme that is inspired on the Bayesian fault isolation
framework is developed. Faults are isolated by matching the fault detection test results, enhanced by a complemen-
tary consistency index that measures the certainty of not being in a fault situation, with the structural information
about the faults stored in the theoretical fault signature matrix. The main difference with respect to the classical
Bayesian approach is that only models of fault-free behavior are used. Finally, the proposed FDI method is as-
sessed against the wind turbine FDI benchmark proposed in the literature, where a set of realistic fault scenarios in
wind turbines are proposed.
Keywords: Fault detection and isolation, Bayesian reasoning, set-membership approaches, wind turbine
benchmark, uncertainty
1. Introduction
Wind turbines stand for a growing part of power production. The future of wind energy passes through the
installation of offshore wind farms. In such locations, a nonplanned maintenance is very costly. Reducing the
cost of wind energy is a key factor in driving successful growth of the wind energy sector. One way of reducing
this cost is to use more refined control systems to balance load reduction and power production in an optimal way
[1, 2]. Another way of reducing the costs is developing wind turbines that require less scheduled and especially
nonscheduled service and have less downtime due to failure [3]. Therefore, a fault-tolerant control (FTC) system
that is able to maintain the wind turbine connected after the occurrence of certain faults can avoid major economic
losses [4]. An important part of an active FTC system is the implementation of a Fault Detection and Isolation
(FDI) system that is able to detect, isolate and, if possible, estimate the faults [5]. Among the fault diagnosis
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methodologies, model-based fault diagnosis is the most developed from a conceptual point of view [6, 5, 7, 8].
The application of model-based fault diagnosis in wind turbines has recently been addressed. Revising the lit-
erature, the first approaches proposed methods range from Kalman filters [9] to observers [10] and parity equations
[11]. The growing interest in wind turbines, coming both from the academia and the industry, has motivated the
proposal of a wind turbine benchmark for FDI and FTC, which has increased considerably the research results.
This benchmark is based on a realistic generic three blade horizontal variable speed wind turbine with a full con-
verter coupling that contains the most common faults reported in practice [12]. This benchmark has been used in
an international competition on FDI and FTC in Wind Turbines aiming at finding the best schemes to diagnose
and handle the different faults proposed. According to [12, 13, 14], the most promising solutions proposed are:
Data-driven [15], Gaussian Kernel Support Vector Machine [16], Estimation [17], Up-Down Counters [18], Com-
bined Observer and Kalman Filter [19], General Fault Model [20], Fuzzy Models [21], online identification [22]
and Set-Membership/Virtual Sensors-Actuators [23, 24].
Fault detection and isolation using statistical methods has been addressed in the literature, starting from the
seminal works of Baseville and Nikiforov [25] to the most recent works of Nyberg [26] and [27]. These methods
rely on the statistical hypothesis theory for detecting and isolating the fault and they are particularly well suited to
take into account measurement noises. As discussed in [28], when detecting faults under a statistical framework,
i.e. using Gaussian distributions to model the noise, the selection of the detection threshold is quite critical and
could imply false alarms because of the distributions tails. For this reason, [28] suggests to use large thresholds
such that false alarms could be avoided. On the other hand, fault detection and isolation has also been consid-
ered under a set-membership framework, see for instance [29] or [30]. This framework is more appropriate to
deal with modeling errors and its main property is that false alarms are avoided in fault detection. Comparing
both approaches, set-membership is appealing for fault detection since false alarms are avoided, but the statisti-
cal framework provides more information that can be used for fault detection and isolation purposes. Thus, both
approaches are complementary if we consider that one of them is more appropriate to deal with modeling errors
whereas the other is more appropriate to deal with measurement noise. However, such a combination has not been
proposed in the literature yet, up to the authors’ knowledge.
Following the previous discussion, this paper proposes to solve the fault detection and isolation problem using
a mixed Bayesian/Set-membership approach. Modeling errors are assumed to be unknown but bounded, following
the set-membership approach. On the other hand, measurement noise is described by statistical distributions but
with hard bounds, following the idea proposed in [28] as discussed above. Hence, the fault detection problem can
be formulated in a deterministic set-membership context. Regarding fault isolation, a new fault isolation scheme
that is inspired on the Bayesian fault isolation framework first introduced by [27] is developed. Faults are isolated
by matching the fault detection test results, enhanced by a consistency index that measures the certainty of not
being in a fault situation, with the structural information about the faults stored in the theoretical fault signature
matrix. The main difference with respect to the approach introduced in [27] is that only models of fault-free
behavior need to be used.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the FDI wind turbine benchmark used as case study in
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the paper. Section 3 defines the consistency index and describes the residuals evaluation procedure that is to be
used for fault detection. Section 4 develops the proposed fault isolation procedure and summarizes the whole fault
detection and isolation methodology by means of an algorithm. Section 5 presents the results of the application
of the fault detection and isolation approach to the FDI wind turbine benchmark. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Wind turbine benchmark
Wind turbines generate electrical energy from the wind kinetic energy. The wind turbine described in the
FDI/FTC benchmark proposed in [12] is a three-blade horizontal-axis variable-speed wind turbine with a full
converter coupling. The basic operation principle is that the wind energy is captured by the blades and transformed
into mechanical rotational energy through the rotor and the shaft. This energy conversion can be optimized by
changing the aerodynamics of the turbine by pitching the blades or by controlling the relative rotational speed of
the turbine against the wind speed. The mechanical energy is in turn converted into electrical energy by a generator
fully coupled to a converter. Between the rotor and the generator, a drive train is used to increase the rotational
speed from the rotor to the generator. The converter can be used to set the generator torque, which consequently
can be used to control the rotational speed of the generator as well as the rotor. The objective of the overall control
system is to track a power reference.
A block diagram of the wind turbine and its system-level control is presented in Figure 1. The main subsystems
are: Blade & Pitch, Drive Train, Generator & Converter and the Controller. The main variable for the operation
of the turbine is the wind speed vω, that acts as a disturbance from the control perspective. The control reference
is the power reference Pr, that in practice is selected according to the wind speed level by an outer loop controller
(details can be found in [12]). The controlled inputs are the pitch positions of each blade, β1, β2 and β3, and the
converter torque τg, being βr (common reference for the three blades) and τg,r the associated references. The pitch
position of each blade is measured using two sensors to ensure physical redundancy: β1,m1, β1,m2, β2,m1, β2,m2, β3,m1,
β3,m2. The generator and rotor speeds are also measured with two sensors each: ωr,m1, ωr,m2, ωg,m1, ωg,m2.
Figure 1: Block diagram of the wind turbine.
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Table 1: Wind Turbine Fault Description
Fault Fault description Type Value Period
f1 Change in pitch 1 Fixed Value β1,m1 = 5o 2000s-2100s
measurement
f2 Change in pitch 2 Gain factor β2,m2 = 1.2β2,m2 2300s-2400s
measurement
f3 Change in Pitch 3 Fixed Value β3,m1 = 10o 2600s-2700s
measurement
f4 Change in Rotor Fixed value ωr,m1 = 1.4rad/s 1500s-1600s
speed sensor
f5 Change in Rotor and Gain factor ωr,m2 = 1.1ωr,m2 1000s-1100s
generator speed ωg,m2 = 0.9ωg,m2
measurements
f6 Parameter abrupt Changed dynamics ωn2 = 11.11→ ωn2 = 5.73 2900s-3000s
change in pitch 2 ζ2 = 0.6→ ζ2 = 0.45
f7 Parameter slowly Changed dynamics ωn3 = 11.11→ ωn3 = 3.42 3400s-3500s
change in pitch 3 ζ3 = 0.6→ ζ3 = 0.9
f8 Offset in converter Offset τg = τg + 2000Nm 3800s-3900s
system
For each blade, the hydraulic pitch system can be modeled as [31]:
β(s)
βr(s)
=
ω2n
s2 + 2ζωns + ω2n
(1)
where β(s) and βr(s) are the pitch angle and its reference, and ωn and ζ are the natural frequency and the damping
ratio of the pitch actuator model.
The generator/converter dynamics can be modeled by:
τg(s)
τg,r(s)
=
αgc
s + αgc
(2)
where τg and τg,r are the generator torque and its reference and αgc is the generator and converter model parameter.
The power produced by the generator Pg depends on the rotational speed of the generator ωg and the applied
load τg:
Pg(t) = ηgωg(t)τg(t) (3)
where ηg is the generator efficiency.
The drive train model consists of a low-speed shaft and a high-speed shaft having inertias Jr and Jg, and friction
coefficients Br and Bg, respectively. The shafts are interconnected by a transmission having a gear ratio Ng and
an efficiency ηdt, combined with a torsion stiffness Kdt, and a torsion damping Bdt. The model is described by the
following three differential equations [32]:
ω˙r(t) = − (Bdt + Br)Jr ωr(t) +
Bdt
NgJr
ωg(t) − KdtJr θ∆(t) +
τr(t)
Jr
(4)
ω˙g(t) =
ηdtBdt
NgJg
ωr(t) −
(
ηdtBdt
N2g Jg
+
Bg
Jg
)
ωg(t) +
ηdtKdt
NgJg
θ∆(t) − τg(t)Jg (5)
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θ˙∆(t) = ωr(t) − ωg(t)Ng (6)
whereωr is the rotor speed,ωg is the generator speed, θ∆ is the torsion angle of the drive train, τr is the aerodynamic
torque and τg is the generator torque.
The values for all the model parameters and details about the controller can be found in [12].
In this paper, the different faults proposed in the FDI/FTC benchmark [12] will be considered, as resumed in
Table 1.
3. Residual Generation and Evaluation for Fault Detection
3.1. Residual generation
Considering the wind turbine model and the set of available sensors defined in the wind turbine FDI benchmark
[12], the application of the structural analysis leads to a set of analytical redundancy relations (ARRs). For each
ARR, a residual is obtained as
r(k,θ) = y(k) − ym(k) (7)
where
• y(k) is the output sensor measurement.
• ym(k) is the the estimation provided by the ARR expression and it is affected by two sources of uncertainty:
ym(k) = yˆ(k,θ) + e(k), where:
– yˆ(k,θ) depends of an unknown parameter vector θ ∈ Θ of dimension nθ × 1 and Θ is the parameter
uncertainty set.
– e(k) is the additive error term which is unknown but it is assumed to be zero mean and bounded by a
constant, |e(k)| ≤ δ. Within the bounds [−δ, δ], a probability distribution pe(e) is assumed as well.
• k is the discrete-time sample.
According to [7], the residual generator can be derived from the input/output form of the ARR as
yˆ(k,θ) = G(q−1,θ)u(k) + H(q−1,θ)y(k) (8)
where u(k) is the input and the particular expressions of G(q−1,θ) and H(q−1,θ) depend on the approach used to
obtain yˆ(k,θ), e.g. a parity equation or an observer (see [29] for more details).
3.2. Bayesian set-membership framework
The residual (7) can be used to detect faults. Thus, a fault is reported if the deviation of the measurement
y(k) cannot be explained by a no faulty model which takes into account both the additive noise and the parameters
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uncertainty. If a fault occurs, the residual (7) is violated, i.e. its magnitude (obtained considering the model
uncertainty) exceeds the pre-specified noise threshold δ.
The effect of the uncertain parameters θ and the additive noise e(k) on the residual (7) can be bounded using
the Bayesian set-membership framework introduced in [33]. This framework relies on the following assumptions:
• The parameter prior distribution p(θ) is assumed to be flat over the considered parameter set Θ, that is, all
models θ in the uncertainty set Θ enjoy, a priori, the same probability level.
• For a fixed θ, the value of yˆ(k,θ), ∀k, is deterministic and it can be computed. Since the observation y(k) is
also known, the only stochastic term in (7) is the additive noise e(k). Therefore, we assume that the residual
probability distribution pr(r|θ) coincides in form with the error probability distribution pr(r|θ) ≡ pe(e).
• Following the equation-error assumption introduced in [34], we assume that the additive noise samples e(k)
are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed). This allows us to estimate the joint probability distribution
pr(r|θ) numerically and sample-to-sample,
pr(r|θ) =
M∏
k=1
pr(r(k)|θ) (9)
3.3. Residual evaluation
Regarding the model uncertainty, and without loss of generality, let us consider that the parameter uncertainty
set is an axis-aligned box Θ:
Θ , [θ1] × · · · × [θnθ ] (10)
where [θ j] = [θ j, θ j], j = 1, . . . , nθ, are the interval bounds for each component θ j of the parameter vector θ, and
the operator × represents the Cartesian product. The interval evaluation of this set of models leads to an interval
model response [yˆ(k)] containing all the possible model responses
[yˆ(k)] ≡
[
yˆ(k), yˆ(k)
]
(11)
where both the estimation yˆ(k,θ) and the measurement y(k) are assumed to be, yˆ(k,θ), y(k) ∈ [yˆ(k)], in the non-
faulty case. This interval quantifies the effect of the parameter uncertainty in the model response and it can be
computed as
yˆ(k) = min
θ∈Θ
yˆ(k,θ) and yˆ(k) = max
θ∈Θ
yˆ(k,θ) (12)
subject to the equations given by (8). The optimization problems (12) can be solved efficiently by using zonotopic
approach described in [35] that since only involves matrix algebraic operations presents a polynomial complexity.
The parameter uncertainty intervals (10) are determined using the optimization procedure described in [36].
This procedure provides the more adjusted prediction intervals (12) that avoid false alarms while minimizing the
size of the detectable faults.
6
The interval model response [yˆ(k)] allows us to define the interval residual as [r(k)] ≡ y(k) − [yˆ(k)], [r(k)] =
[r(k), r(k)].
Now, to introduce the effect of the additive noise, we compare the interval residual [r(k)] to the interval defined
by the additive noise term bounds, [−δ, δ]. If [r(k)] is totally outside the interval [−δ, δ], we decide that there is a
fault and we take the fault indicator φ equal to one. Otherwise, we assume that at least one model in the uncertainty
set is able to explain the observed behavior (in other words, at least one of the models in the uncertainty region is
consistent to the measurements) and consequently we decide that there is no fault taking the fault indicator φ equal
to zero. To illustrate this point, see Figure 2, where the cases (a), (b) and (c) correspond to the no faulty situation
whereas the case (d) corresponds to the faulty case.
Figure 2: Residual evaluation
The worst-case set-membership viewpoint adopted in the fault detection procedure described above implicitly
assumes the no existence of false alarms. Therefore, when we observe φ = 1 we assume that it corresponds to a
true fault. The price to pay is that when we observe φ = 0 we cannot be sure that no fault has occurred, i.e., the
uncertainty may mask the faults, leading to a certain rate of missing faults. This is a well-known problem in the
set-membership approaches [29] and it can induce errors in the fault isolation stage.
In order to solve this problem, in the residual evaluation stage, we propose to produce not only the fault
indicator φ but also an index α indicating how likely is that the fault indicator φ = 0 (apparently indicating no
fault) may correspond to a fault. Note that when we have observed a fault, the α-index is 1.
The α-index can be computed as α = 1 − γ where γ is the so-called consistency index. The consistency index
γ, 0 < γ ≤ 1 , is a number assigned to each non faulty indicator (φ = 0) that indicates our confidence about if the
fault indicator corresponds to the no faulty case or, on the contrary, it may correspond to a missing fault. Note that
in the case that we have observed a fault (φ = 1), the consistency index would be γ = 0. In other words, when we
have a fault, the observed behaviour is totally not consistent with the uncertainty model and noise level considered.
To illustrate the computation of the consistency index γ, it is assumed that the residual r(k) is zero mean
Gaussian distributed inside the hard bounds given by −δ and δ (see Figure 2). Thus, the set-membership feasibility
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region (or uncertainty region) lays between the hard bounds given by −δ and δ. The novelty in this work, compared
to the pure set-membership approaches, is that, in order to compute the consistency index γ, we combine the hard
bounds with the probability distribution of the residual.
Intuitively, an interval residual located in the center of the uncertainty region (case (a)) is less likely to corre-
spond to a missing fault than an interval which is closer to the region border (case (b)) or even in the border itself
(case (c)).
Each of the shadowed areas in Figure 2 can be computed as A =
∫ min(r(k), δ)
max(−δ, r(k)) pr(r)dr . For the case (a), note that
the shadowed area is A0 =
∫ wr/2
−wr/2 pr(r)dr, being wr the width of the interval residual [r(k)]. And note that A0 ≥ A
for every interval [r(k)] with wr width.
In these conditions, the consistency index γ associated to the interval residual with width wr can be computed
as
γ =
A
A0
=
∫ min(r(k), δ)
max(−δ, r(k)) pr(r)dr∫ wr/2
−wr/2 pr(r)dr
(13)
In the case of the Gaussian probability distribution shown in Figure 2, the consistency index is γ = 1 when
the interval residual is totally centered around the mean value of pr or [−δ, δ] ⊂ [r(k)] and it is γ = 0 when it is
outside the set-membership region. The values 0 < γ < 1 indicate different degrees of consistency. The smaller
the consistency index γ is, the larger the probability of a missing fault is. In the case of other distributions, for
example nonsymmetric distributions, the area A0 must be the largest that we can obtain for a fixed wr, since this
corresponds to the region around the nominal model (where the residual probability distribution should present its
maximum value).
The whole procedure for the residual evaluation is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Residual evaluation.
1: Algorithm ResidualEvaluation(u,y,[Θ], δ, pr)
2: γ ← 0
3: Obtain [yˆ] by means of (8) and (12) using [Θ], u, y
4: [r]← y − [yˆ]
5: if [r] ∩ [−δ,+δ] , ∅ then
6: φ← 0
7: Compute γ using (13) by considering pr
8: α← 1 − γ
9: else
10: φ← 1
11: α← 1
12: endif
13: return(φ, α)
14: endAlgorithm
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4. Fault detection and isolation
Fault isolation aims at identifying the faults affecting the system. In standard fault isolation [7], this is carried
out on the basis of the observed fault signatures, generated by the detection module, and their relation with all
the considered faults. Here, the proposed approach follows the same spirit but the reasoning is not based on logic
rules. Instead, a procedure inspired on a Bayesian reasoning framework [27] is used.
As discussed in the introduction, the main difference with the approach proposed in [27] is that in our approach
we only use models of nominal (no faulty) behavior whereas in [27] the reasoning is applied not only to the nominal
model but also to models corresponding to the different faulty situations. The approach proposed here is possible
because of the use of the mixed Bayesian/set-membership framework, introduced in Section 3, which assumes
worst-case hard bounds for the noise, thus allowing us to discard false alarms.
The fault isolation can be performed by considering both the fault indicators φT = (φ1, · · · , φn), being n the
number of considered residuals, and consistency indexes γ = (γ1, · · · , γn) and comparing them to a Fault Signature
Matrix (FSM), denoted as M. This matrix exploits the knowledge about the binary relation between the set of fault
hypotheses and the set of residuals. An element mi j of M is equal to 1 if the fault f j affects the computation of
the residual ri; otherwise mi j = 0. A column mj of M is known as a theoretical fault signature and indicates
which residuals are affected by a given fault f j. A set of faults is isolable if all the columns in M are different (two
identical columns indicate two indistinguishable faults).
Since we are looking for faults, we are interested in knowing how close has been the fault indicator φi = 0 to
be a 1. For this reason, for each residual ri, instead of taking the consistency index γi we take its complementary,
αi = 1− γi. This way, a value for the inconsistency index αi near to 1 indicates that the fault indicator φi = 0 could
in fact be an undetected 1 (i.e., a missing fault). And if αi is small, the probability that φi = 0 would correspond to
a missing fault is small, too.
4.1. Computation of the posterior probabilities
Given the FSM and given the fault indicators φT = (φ1, · · · , φn) with their associated α-indexes, αT =
(α1, · · · , αn), the isolation of a particular fault from the FSM can be performed by means of the computation
of each fault posterior probability by applying the Bayes rule:
p( f j|φ) = p(φ| f j)p( f j)∑m
l=1 p(φ| fl)p( fl)
(14)
where f j, j = 1, ...,m, are the faults, p( f j) is the prior probability assigned to fault f j, p( f j|φ) is the posterior
probability assigned to fault f j, and p(φ| f j) is a value indicating the likelihood that the fault f j is behind the
observed vector φ. This likelihood can be computed for each sample time k as
p(φ| f j) = α(k)T mjn j zv f j(k) (15)
being mj the column in the FSM associated to fault f j, n j the number of nonzero values in the m j and zv f j is the
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zero-violation-factor that checks the consistency of the fault to the violated residuals. This factor can be computed
as
zv f j =
 0, if ∃i ∈ {1, ..., n} with mi j = 0 and φi = 11, otherwise (16)
The term (16) assumes that we do not have false alarms, therefore given the fault indicator vector φT =
(
φ1, · · · , φny
)
some faults can be directly discarded. This is the case when the fault indicator for a certain residual is 1 whereas
the value for that residual in the corresponding fault column is 0.
Note that the prior and posterior probabilities must satisfy
∑m
j=1 p( f j) = 1 and
∑m
j=1 p( f j|φ) = 1, respectively.
Finally, note that the procedure is intrinsically recursive since the posterior probabilities (14) can be used as
prior probabilities in successive iterations, and as long as new measurements become available.
4.2. Example
Let us illustrate the methodology by means of an example. Consider the following FSM,
Table 2: FSM example
f1 f2 f3 f4
r1 1 1 0 0
r2 0 1 1 1
r3 1 0 1 0
and consider that, for the three considered residuals, ri, i = 1, 2, 3, we have the fault indicator vector φT =(
0 1 0
)
with the associated indexes αT =
(
025 1 0.35
)
. Note that the α-index associated to the fault
indicator (φ2 = 1) is α2 = 1. From, the fault indicator vector φ we already know that there is a fault but we have to
decide which one is.
Let us assume that, a priori, all four faults present the same probability, i.e., p( f1) = p( f2) = p( f3) = p( f4) =
1/4. Note that
∑4
j=1 p( f j) = 1.
Now, given the α-indexes and the FSM provided in Table 2, we can compute the likelihood values by applying
(15). Note that fault f1 results directly discarded from the analysis because of the factor zv f1
p(φ| f1) = αT m1n1 zv f1 =
(
025 1 0.35
) 
1
0
1

1
2
· 0 = 0 (17)
p(φ| f2) = αT m2n2 zv f2 =
(
025 1 0.35
) 
1
1
0

1
2
· 1 = 0.625 (18)
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p(φ| f3) = αT m3n3 zv f3 =
(
025 1 0.35
) 
0
1
1

1
2
· 1 = 0.675 (19)
p(φ| f4) = αT m4n4 zv f4 =
(
025 1 0.35
) 
0
1
0

1
1
· 1 = 1 (20)
The posterior probability values given by (14) are:
p( f2|φ) = 0.625 · 1/40.625 · 1/4 + 0.675 · 1/4 + 1 · 1/4 = 0.2717 (21)
p( f3|φ) = 0.675 · 1/40.625 · 1/4 + 0.675 · 1/4 + 1 · 1/4 = 0.2934 (22)
p( f4|φ) = 1 · 1/40.625 · 1/4 + 0.675 · 1/4 + 1 · 1/4 = 0.4348 (23)
Since the fault f4 is the most probable fault, we can decide that the fault f4 is the isolated one. And comparing
faults f2 and f3, we see that the probability to be the fault behind the observed behavior is slighty larger for fault
f3 (0.29) than for fault f2 (0.27). This result was expected since the observed 0 in the third residual is closer to be
a missing fault (φ3 = 0, α3 = 0.35) than the observed 0 in the first residual (φ1 = 0, α1 = 0.25).
One could argue that the posterior probability of f4 is not so far from the posterior probabilities of f2 and f3.
It is true, but this result can be explained because we have used only one time sample in the reasoning process.
To improve the results, we can use the fact that the method allows updating the posterior probabilities with new
measurement data. As long as new measurements are used, one fault tends to one while the others tend to zero. If
we want to stop the search before reaching the probability one for an unique fault, we can select a desired precision
 for the fault isolation procedure.
The whole fault detection and isolation methodology is described in the next subsection.
4.3. Fault detection and isolation algorithm
The fault detection and isolation methodology presented above can be implemented by means of the Algortihm
2. First, the variables f aultDetected, f aultIsolated and mostProbableFault are initialized. A fault is isolated if its
posterior probability is greater or equal to 1 −  being  the desired precision. While a fault has not been isolated,
the residual evaluation Algorithm 1 is applied to every system output yi, i = 1, ..., n, providing the fault indicators
φi and αi indexes. If any fault indicator φi is activated for the first time, the prior probabilities for all m faults are
initialized to 1/m. After a fault has been detected, the posterior probability of each fault is iteratively computed
and the most probable fault at each sample time k is provided. The fault detection and isolation algorithm ends
when the posterior probability of one fault is 1 or near 1(greater or equal to 1 − ) and, consequently, the posterior
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probabilities of the other faults are 0 or close to 0 (less or equal to ).
Algorithm 2 Fault detection and isolation
1: faultDetected← FALSE
2: faultIsolated← FALSE
3: mostProbableFault← EMPTY
4: k ← 0
5: while faultIsolated , TRUE
6: Obtain input-output data {u(k), y(k)} at time instant k
7: for i = 1 to n
8: (φi(k), αi(k))← ResidualEvaluation(u(k),yi(k),[Θ], δi, pri )
9: endfor
10: if ∃φi(k) , 0 and faultDetected = FALSE then
11: faultDetected← TRUE
12: for j = 1 to m
13: p( f j)← 1m
14: endfor
15: endif
16: if faultDetected=TRUE
17: for j = 1 to m
18: Compute zv f j(k) using (16)
19: p(φ| f j)← α(k)T mjn j zv f j(k)
20: endfor
21: Σ← 0
22: for j = 1 to m
23: Λ j ← p(φ| f j)p( f j)
24: Σ← Σ + Λ j
25: endfor
26: for j = 1 to m
27: p( f j|φ)← Λ jΣ
28: p( f j)← p( f j|φ)
29: endfor
30: mostProbableFault← max(p( f1|φ), ..., p( fn f |φ))
31: if ∃p( f j|φ) ≥ 1 −  then
32: faultIsolated← TRUE
33: endif
34: endif
35: k ← k + 1
36: endwhile
37: return( f j)
5. Application and results
5.1. Residual Generation
According to [23], after applying structural analysis [6] with the aid of the SaTool [37] to the set of equations
provided in [12], the following set of twelve residuals expressed as reduced observers in input-output form can be
obtained:
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r1(k) = ωr,m1(k) − ωr,m2(k)
r2(k) =
(
1 − l21q
−1
1 − (a2,1 − l2,1)q−1
)
ωr,m2(k) − b2,1q
−1τr(k) + c2,1q−1τg,m(k)
1 − (a2,1 − l2,1)q−1
r3(k) = ωg,m1(k) − ωg,m2(k)
r4(k) =
(
1 − l4,1q
−1
1 − (a4,1 − l4,1)q−1
)
ωg,m2(k) − b4,1q
−1τr(k) + c4,1q−1τg,m(k)
1 − (a4,1 − l4,1)q−1
r5(k) = β1,m1(k) − β1,m2(k)
r6(k) =
(
1 − l6,1q
−1 + l6,2q−2
1 − (a6,1 − l6,1)q−1 − (a6,2 − l6,2)q−2
)
β1,m2(k)
− (b6,1q
−1 + b6,2q−2)βr(k)
1 − (a6,1 − l6,1)q−1 − (a6,2 − l6,2)q−2
r7(k) = β2,m1(k) − β2,m2(k)
r8(k) =
(
1 − l8,1q
−1 + l8,2q−2
1 − (a8,1 − l8,1)q−1 − (a8,2 − l8,2)q−2
)
β2,m2(k)
− (b8,1q
−1 + b8,2q−2)βr(k)
1 − (a8,1 − l8,1)q−1 − (a8,2 − l8,2)q−2
r9(k) = β3,m1(k) − β3,m2(k)
r10(k) =
(
1 − l10,1q
−1 + l10,2q−2
1 − (a10,1 − l10,1)q−1 − (a10,2 − l10,2)q−2
)
β3,m2(k)
− (b10,1q
−1 + b10,2q−2)βr(k)
1 − (a10,1 − l10,1)q−1 − (a10,2 − l10,2)q−2
r11(k) =
(
1 − l11,1q
−1
1 − (a11,1 − l11,1)q−1
)
τg,m(k) − b11,1q
−1τg,r(k)
1 − (a11,1 − l11,1)q−1
r12(k) = Pg,m(k) − ηgωg,m2(k)τg,m(k)
where ai, j, bi, j and ci, j are model parameters that have to be estimated (ηg is a known coefficient) such that:
θ =
(
a2,1 b2,1 c2,1 a4,1 b4,1 c4,1 a6,1 a6,2 b6,1 b6,2
a8,1 a8,2 b8,1 b8,2 a10,1 a10,2 b10,1 b10,2 a11,1 b11,1
)T (24)
and li, j are the observer gains. This set of residuals will be used for fault detection and isolation. It must be noticed
that a nonlinearity is hidden in some of the residuals due to the use of the variable τr, which is estimated using the
following relation given in [38]:
τr(k) = ρpiR3Cq(λ(k), β(k))vw(k)2/2. (25)
Moreover, SaTool provides the FSM represented in Table 3, which captures the relation between residuals and
faults, where a cross ’x’ indicates that a given residual is affected by a given fault (according to the notation used
in Section 4, mi j = 1 where there is a cross, mi j = 0 elsewhere).
Notice that this paper is not focused on how to obtain the residuals. Structural methods have actually been used
to obtain the residuals for this application, but other methods could be considered and the proposed method could
be applied to the resulting set of residuals, e.g. those obtained by [39].
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Table 3: Fault signature matrix
r f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
r1 x x
r2 x x x x x x x
r3 x
r4 x x x x x x x
r5 x
r6 x
r7 x
r8 x x
r9 x
r10 x x
r11 x
r12 x
Residuals r1, r3, r5, r7 and r9 are static equations that involve the comparison of the value of two different
sensors measuring the same variable. In the same way, the residual r12 compares the value of a sensor with the
one calculated using a static relation with two other sensors. Residuals r2 and r4 are obtained from the drive train
model. Residuals r6, r8 and r10 follow from the hydraulic pitch system model. Finally, the residual r11 is derived
from the converter dynamics model [36].
Previous residuals are affected by noise and parametric uncertainties because residual parameters (24) are esti-
mated using measurements and in some cases with reduced order models. In order to reduce the effect of the noise
in the fault detection and isolation procedures, the variables involved in the discretized regressor equations have
been filtered by second order low-pass filters. Nominal parameters and uncertain parameter bounds of dynamical
residuals have been obtained as described in [36].
Finally, given a set of nonfaulty data, fault-free residual probability distributions pri , i = 1, . . . , 12 are com-
puted. Figure 3 depicts the obtained residual probability distributions.
5.2. Fault Detection and Isolation
Once residual parameters and probability distribution functions have been calibrated, the proposed fault detec-
tion and isolation algorithm of Section 4 has been applied to the data provided by a realistic wind turbine simulator
in the fault scenarios proposed in [12]. For the static residuals: r1, r3, r5, r7, r9 and r12 the consistency indexes
γi(k) have been computed using
γi(k) =
pri (ri(k))
max(pri )
(26)
Next, some results are reported. First, the particular results for three faults (4, 6, and 7) of the sequence specified
in Table 1 are presented and analyzed in detail to illustrate how the method works. After that, the summarizing
results obtained from a more extensive study, a whole set of Monte Carlo simulations taking into account the eight
faults under different scenarios, are provided and compared to the ones obtained by other FDI methods that have
been applied to the wind turbine FDI/FTC benchmark.
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Figure 3: Fault free residual distributions pri , i = 1, ..., 12
Results for fault f4
In this scenario, the fault is introduced at instant t = 1500s. Only the residual fault indicator φ1 is permanently
activated from instant t = 1500.03s during the time that the fault is active and thus α1 = 1 in this time period.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of all coefficients αi, i = 1, . . . , 12, provided by Algorithm 1. Figure 5 depicts the
evolution of the fault posterior probabilities p( fi|φ), i = 1, . . . , 12, provided by Algorithm 2. As it can be seen in
Figure 5 only posterior probabilities p( f4|φ) and p( f5|φ) are different from zero. The detail in Figure 6, shows how,
from the fault detection time t = 1500.03s, p( f4|φ) > p( f5|φ) and therefore the most probable fault provided by
Algorithm 2 is the fault f4 (the correct one).
Results for fault f6
In scenario, the fault occurs at instant t = 2900s. Only the residual fault indicator φ8 is permanently activated
from instant t = 2900.06s during the time that the fault is active and thus α8 = 1 in this time period. Figure 7
shows the evolution of all coefficients αi, i = 1, . . . , 12, provided by Algorithm 1 and Figure 8 depicts the evolution
of the fault posterior probabilities p( fi|φ), i = 1, . . . , 12, provided by Algorithm 2. As it can be seen in Figure 8
only posterior probabilities p( f2|φ) and p( f6|φ) are different from zero and as it can be observed in Figure 9, from
the fault detection time t = 2900.06s, p( f6|φ) > p( f2|φ). Therefore, the most probable fault provided by Algorithm
2 is the fault f6 (the correct one).
Results for fault f7
In this scenario, the fault appears at instant t = 3400s. Only the residual fault indicator φ10 is permanently
activated from time instant t = 3411.60s during the time that the fault is active and thus α10 = 1 in this time period.
Figure 10 shows the evolution of all coefficients αi, i = 1, . . . , 12, provided by Algorithm 1 and Figure 11 depicts
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Figure 4: α coeficients in fault scenario f4
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Figure 5: Posterior probabilities in fault scenario f4
16
1499.8 1499.85 1499.9 1499.95 1500 1500.05 1500.1 1500.15 1500.2
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Time (s)
 
 
p(f4|φ)
p(f5|φ)
Figure 6: Detail of p( f4|φ) and p( f5|φ) in fault scenario f4
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Figure 7: α coeficients in fault scenario f6
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Figure 8: Posterior probabilities in fault scenario f6
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Figure 9: Detail of p( f2|φ) and p( f6|φ) in fault scenario f6
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the evolution of the fault posterior probabilities p( fi|φ), i = 1, . . . , 12, provided by Algorithm 2. As it can be seen
in Figure 11 only the posterior probabilities p( f3|φ) and p( f7|φ) are different from zero. The detail in Figure 9
shows that, the fault is not permanently correctly isolated p( f7|φ) > p( f3|φ) until the time instant t = 3411.98s.
In the time interval t ∈ [3411.60s, 3411.98s], the Algorithm 2 provides either fault f3 or f7 as the most probable
faults. Once this transient has ended, the fault f7 is correctly and permanently isolated.
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Figure 10: α coeficients in fault scenario f7
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Figure 11: Posterior probabilities in fault scenario f7
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Figure 12: Detail of p( f3|φ) and p( f7|φ) in fault scenario f7
Results summary (for all faults)
In order to verify the performance of the proposed fault detection and isolation method, it has been applied to
the whole sequence of eight faults initially considered in the Wind Turbine FDI/FTC benchmark and also presented
in Table 1. In fact, as done in the paper [12] that summarizes and compares the successful application of other FDI
methods to the benchmark, seven different scenarios have been considered as the result of time-shifting (+100, 0,
-100, -200, -300, -400, and -500 s) the occurrence of the faults with respect with the times specified in Table 1
(without changing the wind speed sequence). Moreover, to test the method under different noise realizations, 10
different simulations have been run for each of the seven scenarios. In total, 70 Monte Carlo simulations have been
run for each fault, which assures the representativeness of the results.
The obtained results are summarized in Table 4. Results related to the performance of both fault detection and
fault isolation tasks are provided. In particular, the minimum (Td/i), maximum (Td/i) and mean (T d/i) values for
the detection and isolation times are specified.
Table 4: Summarizing FDI results.
Faults
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
Detection results
T d 0.03s 15s 0.03s 0.03s 0.03 0.06s 11.7s 0.04s
Td 0.03s 0.08s 0.03s 0.03s 0.03 0.05s 7.83s 0.04s
Td 0.03s 77.1s 0.03s 0.03s 0.04 0.11s 19.1s 0.05s
Isolation results
T i 0.03s 15s 0.03s 0.03s 0.03 0.25s 11.9s 0.04s
Ti 0.03s 0.08s 0.03s 0.03s 0.03 0.05s 7.88s 0.04s
Ti 0.03s 77.1s 0.03s 0.03s 0.04 1.5s 20s 0.05s
The obtained results can be compared with the ones reported in [12] (detailed in Tables VIII, IX and X of that
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reference), provided by five different methods: the Gaussian Kernel Support Vector Machine Solution (GKSV);
the Estimation-Based Solution (EB); the Up-Down Counter Solution (UDC); the Combined Observer and Kalman
Filter Solution (COK); and, finally, the General Fault Model Solution (GFM).
A general advantage of the proposed method is that false alarms are eliminated while all the faults are detected
(after some detection time) in all the test scenarios (in comparison, all the methods but the GKSV provide some
false alarms in some scenarios; and for all the methods some faults remain undetected in some scenarios). In a
more detailed analysis, the results obtained for each particular fault can be compared.
For fault f1, the proposed method and also the GKSV, EB, UDC and GFM methods eliminate the false alarms
while providing small detection times (T d=0.02s for GKSV and EB; T d=0.03s for UDC and the proposed method;
T d=0.04s for GFM); on the other hand, the COK method provides some false alarms and moreover a much higher
mean detection time (T d=10.32s).
For fault f2, the GFM method is the fastest in terms of mean detection time but closely followed by the proposed
method (T d=13.7s vs. T d=15s), and it must be taken into account the proposed method eliminates false alarms
while GFM do not; the COK method provides some false alarms and the detection time is a little bit higher
(T d=29.24s); all the other methods provide much higher detection times (T d=47.24s for GKSV; T d=44.65s for
EB; T d=69.12s for UDC) and moreover the EB method produces some false alarms.
For fault f3, the proposed method and both the GKSV and UDC methods eliminate the false alarms while
providing small detection times (T d=0.02s for GKSV; T d=0.03s for the proposed method; T d=0.04s for UDC); all
the other methods generate false alarms and moreover provide higher detection times.
For fault f4, the proposed method is almost as fast as the UDC (T d=0.02s vs. T d=0.03s) but the latter generates
some false alarms; compared with GKSV and EB, both methods also eliminates false alarms but provide higher
detection times (T d=0.11s and T d=0.33s, respectively); finally, the COK and GFM methods generate false alarms
and provide higher detection times.
For fault f5, the proposed method provides much smaller detection times (T d=0.03s vs. T d=25.9s) than the
GKSV that is the only one that eliminates false alarms; on the other hand, the EB method is a little bit faster
(T d=0.01s vs. T d=0.03s) but it generates too many false alarms; all the other methods generate false alarms and
provide higher detection times.
For fault f6, the proposed method clearly provides much better results than all the other methods: the GKSV
method do not even detect the fault, the other methods generate false alarms and provide detection times two orders
of magnitude higher.
For fault f7, the only method that is comparable to the one proposed in this paper is the UDC, although generates
some false alarms and provides a slightly worse detection time (T d=12.93s vs. T d=11.7s); all the other methods
provide worse results: some false alarms and around two times the detection time.
Finally, for fault f8, the proposed method provides good results in all the scenarios while the other methods are
only able to perform well for the original fault sequence specified in Table 1 (which they are designed on).
In summary, all the methods compared in [12] provide good results for some faults and bad results for others,
being the proposed method unique in the sense that provides good results (comparable or better than the obtained
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by the best of the other methods for the particular fault) for all faults and scenarios.
6. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a fault detection and isolation procedure in a mixed Bayesian/set-membership frame-
work where a combined statistical/set-membership description of the noise is proposed. In particular, the noise is
assumed to be unknown but bounded following the set-membership description, but inside the bounds the noise
follows a statistical distribution. The fault detection stage produces not only a fault indicator for the cases fault and
no-fault but also a consistency index indicating the certainty that the no-fault observation does not correspond to
a missing fault. The fault indicator and consistency indexes, along with the structural information about the fault
stored in the theoretical fault signature matrix, are used in the fault isolation stage, where a new fault isolation
scheme that is inspired in the Bayesian fault isolation framework is developed. The main difference with respect
to the existing approaches is that in our approach only models of nominal no faulty behavior are needed. The
presented FDI method has been satisfactorily assessed against the wind turbine FDI benchmark proposed in the lit-
erature where a set of typical fault scenarios have been developed. As a future work, the authors propose to extend
the proposed approach to deal with outliers and fault models by further exploiting the Bayesian framework.
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